Authors: Ia Asatiani, Aydan Yusif, Mariam Katchkatchashvili

According to Georgia’s foreign trade data, 54 tractors and bulldozers were exported to Kyrgyzstan in 2022 and 2023. The Kyrgyz government reports that it did not receive any. No such discrepancy was recorded before the war in Ukraine. Previously, Georgian and Kyrgyz trade databases reported matching figures for heavy machinery in this category.

Similarly, the tractors and bulldozers intended for Armenia vanished without a trace.

What is happening? Where does this heavy machinery end up? And what role does occupying Russia play in this story? — You’ll find out in our investigation.

We have proven time and again that Georgia's borders serve as a “green corridor” for sanctions evasion. First, we reported on the export of vehicles from Larsi to Russia; then, the uncontrolled export of drones; and most recently, we uncovered how Russian oil is reaching Europe without hindrance as Georgian oil.

This time, we reveal how Russia has once again evaded sanctions and continues to receive bulldozers, excavators, graders, tractors, cranes, and snow groomers—heavy equipment also used in military logistics—without interruption.

The European Union restricted the supply of exactly this type of equipment to Russia under its 8th and 10th sanctions packages, published in October 2022 and February 2023, respectively. These packages covered 22 commodity codes.

“...The additional restrictions apply to goods that can easily be used for military purposes and that enhance Russia’s combat capabilities,” reads a statement from the European Commission dated February 25, 2023.

Against this backdrop, many countries continue to trade with the occupying force using sanctioned goods—among them Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia.

Research Methodology

The data presented in this article has been collected from international trade databases such as Volza, ImportGenius, and ComtradePlus. We also obtained official trade statistics from the national statistical offices of Georgia, Armenia, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

All data was thoroughly analyzed and cross-checked to uncover inconsistencies between sources.

The article explains export schemes through the example of three Georgian companies. We retrieved data about these companies from international trade databases. In their case, we could trace, based on concrete facts and evidence, that the heavy machinery they sometimes shipped to third countries ultimately ended up in Russia.

This was verified by matching the exported machinery's Vehicle Identification Numbers (VINs) with those recorded upon entry into Russia, and by cross-referencing the geographic locations of the recipient companies.

ImportGenius is a U.S.-based international trade intelligence platform founded in Arizona. It collects customs data from Europe, Asia, North America, and Latin America, relying exclusively on official documentation submitted by customs authorities.
Volza, another U.S.-based international trade database headquartered in Delaware, compiles trade data from official institutions and customs declarations.
ComtradePlus is the United Nations’ foreign trade platform. It aggregates statistical data from customs authorities worldwide and provides access to structured, official trade information.

How Does Sanctioned Cargo Reach Russia?

Route #1: Fictitious Destinations and Statistical Absurdities

Heavy equipment crosses the borders of several countries—sometimes through one scheme, sometimes another—and eventually reaches Russia “safely.”

Official statistics confirm that this supply chain to Russia was established after the start of the war in Ukraine. From 2022 to April 2025, 2,403 units of tractors, bulldozers, specialized machinery, excavators, and graders were sent from Georgia to neighboring Armenia, Azerbaijan, and five Central Asian countries. By contrast, in the previous three years, 2019 to 2021, only about 1,000 such machines were exported.

machinery-from-georgia-to-third-countries

At first glance, this statistic may not seem alarming—unless we suspect some of this cargo will ultimately end up in Russia. And we do have reason for suspicion: official foreign trade data.

Let’s start with one statistical absurdity: The heavy equipment sent from Georgia doesn’t remain in Armenia.

According to Geostat, from 2022 to March 2025, Georgia exported 1,245 units of heavy equipment to Armenia, including 339 tractors, 86 units of specialized machinery, and 820 bulldozers, excavators, or graders. However, the Armenian side claims it did not receive such cargo from Georgia during that period.

What does this mean? Most likely, the machinery did not even arrive in Armenia. It was rerouted to another country, or it arrived in Armenia and was then re-exported. If you can't guess where, this data will tell you:

In recent years, Armenia has seen an unprecedented increase in heavy equipment trade with Russia—in 2023 only, a 274,400% increase compared to 2021, and in 2024, a 6,500% increase over 2021.

Like Armenia, cargo from Georgia, supposedly destined for Kyrgyzstan, is not arriving in Kyrgyzstan. Even the car dealers themselves do not hide this.

“Today, we transferred ownership of these cars to our Kyrgyz-registered company, loaded them onto tow trucks, and are sending them to Vladikavkaz, where they will be met and taken to Russia,” said one car dealer, Anton Bai, in 2023 on his own YouTube channel.

Anton Bai is a Russian vlogger who relocated to Georgia after the war began, built a business, and sells sanctioned vehicles to Russia via social media. From 2022 to February 2024, Bai earned at least USD 1.9 million and opened a company branch in Russia.

Seems the same scheme applies to heavy machinery. Tractors, excavators, and specialized equipment purchased in Georgia are officially exported to Central Asia. They exit the country via Larsi but never continue to Asia — they remain in Russia. The statistics back this up.

Georgia reports that in 2024, it exported 63 units of heavy equipment to Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan, however, claims it received only six units (4 tractors + 2 units of specialized machinery). The fate of the “disappeared” cargo isn’t hard to guess, especially considering that all of this equipment traveled to Kyrgyzstan by land and could not have reached there without passing through Russian territory.

Georgian authorities explain the statistical mismatch by saying that the cargo may have been re-exported to Kyrgyzstan. That is, it entered Georgia from another country and left for a third destination. For example, if a Georgian company imported a bulldozer from Turkey and sold it to a Kyrgyz firm, Kyrgyzstan might record it as a Turkish import.

However, this justification doesn’t explain six bulldozers. According to database records, these machines were exported from Georgia to Kyrgyzstan as local exports—meaning they were located in Georgia, departed from Georgia, and may even have been assembled or manufactured there. Therefore, they should appear in Kyrgyzstan’s trade records as imports from Georgia. There is not a single one that appears in Kyrgyzstan’s 2024 trade

Route #2: Directly from Georgia to Russia

In the summer of 2023, while investigating how sanctioned vehicles reached Russia, we also visited the Armenian border. Near the Sadakhlo customs checkpoint, we met the trailer driver—an Armenian citizen named Kajik—returning to Armenia after Larsi.

Kajik complained: "I brought a bulldozer from Armenia and was taking it to Russia, but the Georgian border guards at Larsi didn’t allow me to cross and sent me back."

ტრაქტორი - მძიმე ტექნიკა — Kajiki's cargo that was not allowed to pass through Larsi
Photo: July 11, 2023

The issue was that Kajik’s heavy equipment was manufactured in the United States, and since 2022, exporting such machinery to Russia has been prohibited.

"I’ve taken the same bulldozer to Russia twice—once ten days ago, and again three months ago. Today I asked the border guards, 'If you let me pass before, why not now?' They told me: 'The system has been updated and now it shows this cargo is sanctioned,'" Kajik told us.

By 2024, restrictions at the Larsi crossing had been simplified. Heavy machinery is now being exported to Russia not only from Armenia, but also directly from Georgia.

Only five tractors, worth 430,000 USD, were exported directly from Georgia to Russia between 2014 and 2020. From 2020 to 2023, not a single unit of this cargo was exported to Russia, as the war in Ukraine made transporting heavy equipment across Larsi practically impossible. Later, however, the situation changed.

In February 2024, two tractors worth 193,000 USD were sent directly from Georgia to Russia. From January to February 2025, four more tractors, worth 407,000 USD, were exported again by road.

Geostat data shows that since the start of the war in Ukraine, Georgia has been exporting not only to Russia but also to so-called third countries in significant volumes.

To better understand whether Georgia trades in sanctioned cargo with third countries and Russia, we checked international import-export databases: ImportGenius and Volza.

According to Volza, the number of tractors sent from Georgia to Russia exceeds Geostat’s official records.

Volza records show that seven German brand tractors were exported directly from Georgia to Russia between July and December 2022, none of which are reflected in Georgia’s official statistics.

The 2024 data from Volza and Geostat match. Volza confirms that two German CLAAS tractors were exported from Georgia to Russia last year. To remind you, importing European-made heavy machinery into Russia was under sanctions then. In this instance, the cargo was transported by an Arab shipping company.

სქრინი Volza-ს ბაზიდან — Screenshot from Volza database

From June to July 2024, Turkish-made heavy machinery also passed through Larsi into Russia. According to Volza, the Georgian company Georgiantrans+ sent six HIDROMEK-brand excavator-loaders, produced in Turkey and valued at 600,000 USD, to the Russian company Ruskon Spetstechnika. We confirmed that the shipment left Georgia and arrived in St. Petersburg, Russia.

სქრინი Import Genius-ის ბაზიდან — Screenshot from IG database

[Author’s note: Importing Turkish-made machinery into Russia is not officially prohibited. EU sanctions apply only to European-made brands. However, it’s important to note that Turkey also introduced additional regulations in March 2023, restricting exports of goods sanctioned by the European Union to Russia.]

"Georgiantrans+" was registered in 2013 in Kobuleti. Its business includes customs and brokerage services, and re-export and re-export logistics. Irakli Nemsadze owns and directs the Georgian Association of Land Transporters.

When we asked Nemsadze about the cargo his company shipped to Russia, he told us that he had sent the heavy machinery to an Uzbek company participating in a tender and needed the excavator-loaders. However, the batch shipped from Georgia had technical defects and was no longer suitable for the tender.

What happened next? According to Nemsadze, the Uzbek company sold the cargo to Russia without customs procedures. That’s how Turkish-made excavators originally shipped from Georgia ended up in St. Petersburg. When asked to name the Uzbek company, Nemsadze replied that he couldn’t remember.

When asked if he faced any obstacles exporting the cargo from Georgia, he told us:
“When we were going through customs clearance procedures in Batumi, we were delayed. This is a specific type of cargo. Every re-export destined for Central Asia or neighboring countries was being inspected because there’s always the risk that it might end up in Russia. That’s why there was a pause. Then they verified everything and let us through.”

According to Nemsadze, based on his experience, exporting Turkish-made heavy machinery from Georgia is not a problem if the machinery doesn’t contain parts made in the UK.

“We couldn’t verify that ourselves. There was a risk that the imported tractor might contain a British-made engine or gearbox, which could cause it to get stuck in Georgia—or, without meaning to, we might have ended up involved in a transaction that isn't fully permitted. That’s why we decided to refrain from accepting or delivering that particular excavator-loader”- he said.

He transports cargo from one location to another on behalf of various clients, including deliveries to Russia.

NEW HOLLAND-ის მოდელი, რომელიც "ჯორჯიანტრანსის" გადაზიდვით რუსეთში მოხვდა. ფოტო: ავტომარკეტი lectura.specs.com — The NEW HOLLAND model that reached Russia via transportation by 'Georgiantrans'
Photo: Automarket lectura.specs.com

According to ImportGenius, from August 2023 to August 2024, “Georgiantrans” shipped 14 excavator-loaders to Russia: 13 were HIDROMEK machines made in Turkey, and one was an Italian-made NEW HOLLAND.

We verified that this equipment indeed reached Russia not only through databases but also by analyzing the Russian vehicle marketplace Avito.ru.

In February 2024, “Georgiantrans” delivered two HIDROMEK-brand black-and-white excavator-loaders to the Russian company Autokamotors.

We came across a listing on Avito.ru showing that in March 2024, AUTOKAMMOTORS was selling exactly this type of excavator-loader. In the photo, the machines are parked in front of the company’s store in Naberezhnye Chelny, Tatarstan.

AUTOKAMMOTORS was registered in Russia in 2019. It is owned by two Russian citizens, Almaz Gabdrakhmanov and Evgeny Krapivin. Since 2019, the company has been active on Avito.ru, selling heavy machinery, light vehicles, and boats. It deals in well-known European, Chinese, and Korean brands, including PORSCHE, HYUNDAI, LIFAN და FIAT.

The company purchased one excavator-loader for about 10 million rubles (roughly 110,000 USD) and listed it on the marketplace for approximately 14 million rubles (160,000 USD).

The purchase date and the listing date on Avito.ru closely follow one another. The heavy machinery was shipped to Russia in February and appeared for sale on the platform in March. The recipient’s name, the brand, and the design all match. Taken together, these details strongly suggest that the excavator-loaders selling on Avito.ru are the very same Turkish-made machines sent by GeorgiaTrans.

HIDROMEK-ის მძიმე ტექნიკა АВТОКАММОТОРС-ის მაღაზიის წინ, ფოტო: Avito.ru, 2024 წლის მარტი — HIDROMEK heavy machinery in front of the AUTOKAMMOTORS store
photo: Avito.ru, March 2024

According to Import Genius, the excavator-loaders were shipped directly from Georgian territory, but the commercial transaction—such as payment transfers—took place between the Russian and Armenian sides. For this reason, the shipment does not appear in Georgia’s official statistics as an export to Russia. The National Statistics Office of Georgia explains that because a third country was involved in the transaction, the cargo passed through Georgia in transit and is not counted as an export.

The activities of “Georgiantrans” are also mentioned in a report by the Norwegian analytical company “Corisk,” which studied the export of foreign and sanctioned cargo from Georgia to Russia between 2022 and November 2024.

“Georgiantrans” LLC was registered in 2011. Its legal address is Kobuleti, while its operational office is in Batumi. The current owner and director is Gocha Giorgadze, although until February 2025, the director was Irakli Nemsadze. When we contacted “Georgiantrans+” about the issue, Nemsadze told us: I’ll answer questions about ‘Georgiantrans’ as well, since I’m the executive manager and oversee operational activity.

Nemsadze confirmed that transporting cargo from Georgia to Russia on behalf of a foreign company is a common and accepted practice: “It’s a widespread practice, and not just in the case of Armenia… For example, the client could be based in the Emirates and might instruct, ‘Pick up the cargo in Turkey and deliver it to Russian territory.’Third parties take part in the trade without having any physical contact with the goods. They are involved in the transaction remotely and delegate the execution to a chosen shipping company.”

At the end of the conversation, he didn’t hide the fact that he personally knows many Georgian shipper companies that don’t have the luxury to act based on moral standards and avoid working with Russia. Like it or not, he said, that market remains too important for them to ignore.

We also asked Nemsadze about a shipment by “Georgiantrans” involving a Kyrgyz client and transporting sanctioned Italian-brand heavy machinery to Russia. He replied:
“I don’t remember that case—it was probably a one-time collaboration.”

“When placing an order, the client doesn’t give you detailed information about the commodity codes you’re supposed to transport. You can’t ask for that; they’re not obligated to provide this. You find this information later in the database, but that’s after the fact. That’s why, in the case of direct shipments from Turkey to Russia, if they bypass Georgia, there remains the risk of unintentionally transporting sanctioned goods”.

The clients in the cases we discussed were PARMOS, BAS LOGISTICS, G-PRO TECH and TIMER TULPAR. These companies were the ones who purchased the heavy machinery delivered to Russia, signed contracts with the transporters or sellers, and paid for the transportation costs.

PARMOS is a microenterprise registered in 2004 in the Belgorod region of Russia. Its owner and director is Alexei Parfenov. The company operates in various fields, including printing, TV and radio broadcasting, highway construction, and the repair and maintenance of vehicles. PARMOS is also actively involved in Russian state procurement.
BAS LOGISTICS is a company registered in Kazakhstan in 2023. It is owned and managed by Kseniya Grigorieva. Bus Logistics operates in the fields of land, rail, and air freight. Its trade partners include countries in Europe, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia.
G-PRO TECH is a company registered in Uzbekistan that supplies construction and agricultural equipment to Russian enterprises. According to its website, it maintains offices in Tashkent, Tbilisi, and across Europe, and is actively engaged in the heavy machinery trade along these routes.
TIMER TULPAR is a company registered in Kyrgyzstan in 2023. It imports and distributes construction equipment. It sources heavy machinery from Turkey and China and supplies it to Russia. According to the international trade database Trademo, Timer Tulpar ranks among the top importers to Russia in this sector.

Route #3: From Georgia to Russia via an Indirect Path

Some Georgian shipping companies seem to avoid transporting sanctioned cargo directly to Russia, opting instead for indirect routes. One such company is “LLC Basmotors.”

Between March and June 2024, this Georgian company sent 10 units of heavy machinery, worth 1 million USD, to Ruskon Spetstechnika. Eight excavator-loaders were dispatched from a facility in Batumi, and two from Tbilisi. Eventually, all of them ended up in St. Petersburg, Russia.

To confirm that the shipment from “Basmotors” indeed reached Russia, we verified the models sent by the company and those listed on the Russian automotive market by RUSKON SPETSTECHNIKA. We examined the most popular vehicle trading website, Avito.ru.

We found that the excavator-loader models shipped from Georgia and listed on Avito.ru by RUSKON SPETSTECHNIKA are identical.

We verified that Basmotors delivered 10 excavator-loaders to Russia. However, Georgia’s official statistics record only two of these as exports.

As for the remaining eight units of equipment, Geostat reports that “Basmotors” exported them not to Russia, but to Armenia and Uzbekistan. However, according to the Armenian Statistical Service, no excavator-loaders were received from either this company or Georgia as a whole in 2024.

All of this further confirms that the cargo allegedly shipped by “Basmotors” to Armenia and Uzbekistan actually ended up in Russia.

We know that LLC “Basmotors” was registered in 2014 and is the official dealer of the Turkish company HIDROMEK in Georgia. The company’s showroom is located on Davit Aghmashenebeli Avenue in Tbilisi, and it also operates an auto service center in Batumi, where it provides technical maintenance for vehicles.

The owners and directors of “Basmotors” are brothers Ruslan and Amiran Basiladze. The family owns a total of nine companies, operating in the automotive, construction, accounting, and auditing sectors.

Among these companies, three - “Basmotors,” “Basmotors Tbilisi,” and “Rom Trans” - actively participate in public procurement, primarily selling heavy machinery and spare parts. From 2013 to 2025, these companies secured contracts worth more than 9 million GEL through tenders and simplified procurement. The leading buyers among them are the agencies of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara (as of May 1).

"ბასმოტორსის" თბილისის ოფისი, წყარო: ფეისბუქ გვერდი — 'Basmotors' Tbilisi office, source: Facebook page

We asked the director of “Basmotors” why the company concealed the true final destination of the cargo in official documents. Initially, Ruslan Basiladze denied any trade with Russia, saying it was “impossible.” However, he later admitted: “So what, I sold it, so what… Millions of pieces of equipment go to Russia every day. If it’s declared, if it’s sold, it will be sold, what’s the problem?”

Regarding the evidence obtained by “iFact” indicating that the heavy equipment allegedly sent to Uzbekistan and Armenia by his company ultimately ends up in Russia, Basiladze stated: “I wasn’t involved in transportation. I sold the cargo in Batumi and didn’t follow up on its subsequent route.

“I sold it to the person, made the export official, and what he changed or where he took it afterwards, I don’t know… How can I track down the owner? I’m not his watchman.”

Here’s what we know about the Russian companies that received the sanctioned cargo from Georgian exporters:

RUSKON SPETSTECHNIKA was registered in St. Petersburg in 2019 and has since been engaged in the wholesale trade of vehicles. The company’s owners are Russian citizens Pavel Veryuzhsky, Maxim Degel, Yuri Stegantsev, and Roman Pozokhin. Since 2023, it has been appearing on Avito.ru and exclusively selling heavy machinery. The company purchases automotive transport equipment from China, South Korea, and other Asian countries.

MACHINERY GROUP was registered in Vladivostok, Russia, in 2020 and is involved in the import of both trucks and heavy machinery, including spare parts. The goods are primarily imported to Russia from China, Japan, and Korea. The company’s owners are Russian citizens Alexander Ivanov, Dmitry Kalinin, and Oleg Sokolov.

Route #4: Through Georgian Territory into Russia

Another pathway by which excavators reach Russia is the Turkey–Georgia–Vladikavkaz corridor.

According to data from the international trade platform Volza, between October 17 and 30, 2024, 80 CASE-brand excavator-loaders entered Georgia through Sarpi and exited to Russia via the Larsi border checkpoint. The cargo was delivered to the Russian company Higer Bus Rus by three suppliers. Two of them are identified as Turkish firms: Kiraç Elektrik İnşaat Mühendislik and Troy Construction Mühendislik. The name of the third supplier is redacted in the database.

Higer Bus Rus, registered in Moscow in 2022, primarily sells Chinese-manufactured buses. [Author’s note: Since 2022, the export of American-made heavy machinery to Russia has been officially prohibited.]

CASE is an American brand that manufactures its products in Italy, India, and Turkey. In April 2023, its parent company, CNH Industrial, exited the Russian market and sold off its local assets. Nevertheless, CASE equipment continues to reach the aggressor country via Georgia.

CASE-ის ამ მოდელის ექსკავატორ-დამტვირთველი გაიგზავნა საქართველოს გავლით რუსეთში — This model of CASE backhoe loader was sent to Russia via Georgia

As with our previous investigations, we attempted to schedule an interview with the Revenue Service of Georgia to understand how the movement of sanctioned or foreign cargo is monitored at the borders, and whether the agency was aware of the cases described in this article. However, we did not receive confirmation for an interview before publication. We will update the article with their written response once it becomes available.

Some of the international trade data referenced in this article was obtained with OCCRP ID and Erlend Bjørtvedt, founder of the Norwegian analyst company Corisk

Contributors to the article: Graphic Designer: Nino Gagua, Editor: Manana Ghoghoberidze, Editor-in-Chief: Nino Bakradze

Why wasn’t the Qvevri school built with a loan useful to the winemakers?

Editor's Picks

The Sanction Loophole: Heavy Machinery’s Hidden Route to Russia

Hit by Sanctions, Georgian Oligarch Ivanishvili Brings Assets Home

Protests against the Russification