On the October 26 elections, a “carousel” scheme was active at several polling stations—some voters cast more than one vote, re-entered polling stations, and marked ballots on behalf of others. They registered with documents of individuals with entirely different appearances, ages, or even genders. Registrars, however, “turned a blind eye” to these clear discrepancies.
CEC’s “neutral” commission members also ignored cases where pieces of paper with another person’s personal identification number were hastily taped into passports using adhesive tape.
In principle, observers should have noticed these violations, but they were not allowed near the registration desks. As a result, uncovering the “carousel” depended entirely on the integrity of the commission members. You can judge for yourself how conscientiously they worked. We have already discussed the example of Imereti, where the so-called “neutral” members appointed by the CEC were predominantly supporters of the ruling party.
Like the registrars, the verification devices purchased by the election administration were also “blind.” They could not determine whether the ID or passport presented at the polling station belonged to the person presenting it.
We investigated and, through this journalistic inquiry, are reporting what steps the CEC did or did not take to ensure that a reliable and tamper-proof verification device would be available for the October 26 elections.
We examined procurement documents, international models of technological elections, and spoke with around 20 individuals—election researchers, former election administration employees, opposition members both within and outside the CEC, programmers, and personal data experts.
From this article, you will learn:
- What an alternative model of verification devices with facial, retinal, or fingerprint recognition could have protected election;
- Whether the CEC could have purchased a device capable of easily reading both ID cards and passports.
Could Smartmatic’s Devices Read Both ID Cards and Passports?
In the October 26 elections, the main attribute of the main falsification scheme was the passport and the personal identification numbers taped into it. The CEC stated that the verification device only read ID cards, and if one came with a passport, the registrar would have to manually enter the data. Ultimately, it turned out that registrars were manually entering personal numbers dictated aloud or read from a piece of paper.
The commission members trained by the CEC acted as instructed—placing only ID cards into the vertical slot of the verification device. This slot houses the so-called MRZ reader (Machine Readable Zone), a scanner that uses a laser beam to capture and recognize personal data, specifically the MRZ code. This 2–3 line unique code is located on the bottom of every person’s ID card and passport and contains symbols, letters, and numbers.
Naturally, the question arises: if this code exists on both passports and ID cards, how can it be explained that the MRZ reader on the devices purchased by the CEC only recognized ID cards?
This limitation was not Smartmatic International’s idea. The functional characteristics of the devices were determined by the CEC. If desired, the company could have supplied devices capable of reading passports, just as they provided to Albania and Armenia.
Now, let’s explain in detail what kind of verification device the CEC ordered and what alternatives were rejected. The CEC purchased the VIU Desktop 800 series verification device from Smartmatic International, specifically the new model VIU Desktop 818-100. Documents uploaded to the state procurement website reveal that the CEC initially considered devices capable of reading passports as well.
“[The proposed] device ensures voter identification through both digital and manual search systems. Specifically: using the MRZ reader, it must be possible to process/read a Georgian citizen’s passport and/or electronic identification card (ID card). If necessary, the device allows manual entry of voter data,” reads the technical specifications prepared by the CEC.
That scanning passports was not an impossible task and that Smartmatic International could provide such functionality if desired is also confirmed on their official website:
“The VIU Desktop 800 series devices can read data from ID cards as well as passports… All these options are available to government authorities to decide as per their needs…”
The fact that this model could read passports was confirmed on November 13, during a City Court hearing by Giorgi Santuriani, head of the CEC’s Legal Department and a member of the technical-consultative group for Smartmatic’s procurement:
“The verification device has such capability, but our passports were not compatible with it, and this was stated from the beginning. It has not changed now; it was initially outlined in the procurement terms,” Santuriani stated.
When asked, “What is missing from our passports that others have?” he responded, “I am unfamiliar with the specifics of passports.”
We learned about this specificity and will explain what it involves.
As specialists explain, the CEC could restrict passport recognition by programming the MRZ scanner to only read the personal identification number.
The issue is that the MRZ codes on Georgian ID cards and passports differ: the ID card’s MRZ contains the 11-digit personal identification number, while the passport’s MRZ includes only the holder’s date of birth and passport number.
According to software engineer Giorgi Lubaretzi, since the CEC’s verification devices are not equipped with a chip reader and rely on MRZ, they could easily read passports with minimal software adjustments:
“There would be no hardware or software issue. Alongside personal numbers, passport numbers should simply be added to the database. In the database, this would involve creating an additional column for passport numbers. While this might slightly increase administrative costs, replacing the scanner would likely not be necessary. It simply reads the MRZ regardless of the document type. Therefore, the limitation lies not in the device but in the software.”
The CEC also confirms this version. When asked if the verification device would recognize passport numbers if they were loaded into the system alongside personal numbers, the CEC’s press office responded:
“Voter lists are prepared as they are, and the scanner is designed accordingly. In the list, the primary identifier is the personal identification number.”
Technological elections using verification devices purchased from Smartmatic were held in Albania between 2021 and 2023 and in Armenia in 2017. Both countries used the same VIU-800 series devices, specifically the VIU-Desktop 818 and VIU-815 models. Both models could read IDs, passports, and voters’ fingerprints.
In video materials from the Central Election Commissions of Albania and Armenia, it is clearly visible that the registrar places and scans a single page of a passport in the narrow slot.
Armenian and Albanian passports differ from Georgian ones in that the single page containing personal information, including the MRZ code, is comparatively rigid and laminated. Someone might argue that Georgian passports could not pass freely through the device’s slot due to their lack of plasticity. However, let us remind you how Georgian non-laminated, paper passports are placed in Turkey’s airport Wi-Fi kiosk narrow scanners. As a result, the passport pages neither get damaged nor tear.
Moreover, if observed closely, Armenian passport pages are not as rigid as to match a plastic ID card. [In the video at 07:20, you can see how a single passport page bends and flutters as it is placed in the scanner.]
As it turns out, the CEC made a unilateral decision on what kind of devices to purchase, without informing the opposition or other interested parties. The issue of non-transparency arises repeatedly in other parts of this article.
“When the law gives me the right to participate with a passport, and the machine cannot digitally identify this document, it becomes a very big problem. This is not the law’s fault but the CEC’s fault for not purchasing a machine that could also read passports. So, the ‘gap’ here became very large… To be honest, I don’t know when this was decided… I think this was a unilateral decision by the CEC. Who they consulted with and how, within the government hierarchy, I don’t know. However, I know for sure that there were no public discussions,” said Koka Kandelaki, founder of the “International Center for Civic Culture,” who has been studying and observing elections since the 1990s.
It seems the election administration did not consider passport scanning essential, as the head of the CEC’s Public Relations Office also claimed to have no knowledge of any violations involving the use of passports.
“I have no information about what was taped or why it was taped. The procedure should have been carried out according to the rules established by law. All precinct election commission members underwent appropriate training… As far as I know, observers from monitoring organizations also received appropriate training. So, why and for what reason those papers were taped, my answer to this would be very unserious.”
How Did We Purchase Smartmatic’s Verification Devices?
The gradual introduction of technology into elections began in 2018 during by-elections and special elections. As part of the reform, the CEC initially introduced electronic vote-counting machines, replacing the transparent ballot box with ballot scanners and black boxes. Four years later, verification devices appeared at polling stations, replacing the traditional function of paper lists.
For the October 26 elections, verification devices were supplied by Smartmatic, to which the CEC paid a total of 62 million GEL. This amount included both the supply of devices and software development. In the tender announced in June 2023, Smartmatic was the sole supplier and had no competitors.
From the price table uploaded in the tender documentation, we learn that the CEC purchased 6,686 verification devices. Each device cost $1,003, amounting to over $6.7 million just for these devices.
A special technical-consultative group was formed to evaluate Smartmatic International’s proposal, including two representatives each from the Procurement Agency and the CEC:
- From the CEC: Giorgi Santuriani and Giorgi Sturua.
- From the Procurement Agency: Khariton Shalamberidze and Nino Gamrekeli.
From the documentation uploaded to the Procurement Agency’s website, we learn that Smartmatic International met the following CEC requirements:
- Two technological elections conducted in the last five years with no fewer than 3.1 million voters.
- At least one use of similar devices in national, municipal, or regional elections in any country within the past five years.
- Certification confirming the successful operation of the devices and at least two recommendation letters from election management bodies.
- An audit report confirming the successful operation of the devices.
Smartmatic International was founded in 1985 in the Netherlands, with its parent company, SGO Corporation Limited, registered in the United Kingdom. The company’s representatives are citizens of the Netherlands, Spain, Venezuela, Egypt, and Bulgaria. It has offices in the USA, Taiwan, London, the Netherlands, Estonia, and Panama. Its technologies have been used in over 70 elections in the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Africa.
Before this year’s parliamentary elections, Smartmatic’s technologies were also used in Georgia during the 2021 local elections and the 2022–2023 by-elections.
As we learned, Smartmatic International is represented in Georgia by Irakli Khorbaladze, who organized presentations to promote the devices. Khorbaladze is the author of the electronic elections project and led the 2021 pilot elections.
“Before Smartmatic won the CEC tender, Irakli Khorbaladze had introduced us—opposition and everyone else—to these devices. He was visiting parties and explaining their advantages. This happened around 2020 after the elections,” recalled Anna Kobakhidze, an opposition member of the CEC.
Irakli Khorbaladze is the founder and executive director of the Institute for Good Governance. He has worked on the institutional development of political parties for over ten years. Between 2012 and 2016, he was a member of the CEC from the Georgian Dream coalition, specifically the Republican Party. In 2013, he also supported Tamar Zhvania’s election as chairperson.
It appears that Khorbaladze maintained a comfortable relationship with the ruling party while in the CEC. Despite donating 11,200 GEL to the Republican Party between 2012 and 2015, he later switched to funding Georgian Dream, donating 10,000 GEL as a one-time contribution in October 2015.
Biometric Recognition as a Measure Against the “Carousel”
Three types of machines were used in the October 26 elections: verification devices, vote counters, and tablets. None of these tools had the capability to identify voters through facial, retinal, or fingerprint biometric data. This responsibility was left solely to the CEC’s commission members.
“The voter registrar commission member checks the correspondence between the voter’s face and the photograph in the presented document,” reads the Georgian Election Code.
In conversations with iFact, former election administration members and political analysts agreed that if biometric recognition had been used in this election, the risks of “carousel” fraud would have been significantly reduced.
In June 2021, during a simulated voting session, the CEC tested this approach during a pilot election. A citizen’s identification was first carried out using their personal identification number and then confirmed through facial scanning. In 2021, when Aleko Elisashvili decided to enter parliament, he signed a memorandum with Georgian Dream, which included a fingerprint mechanism. However, the CEC rejected these options and ultimately opted for “blind” devices, which did not eliminate “carousel” risks.
Fingerprint-based voter verification was used in Armenia during the 2017 parliamentary elections and in Albania during the 2021–2023 elections. In both cases, Smartmatic technology was used. Why, then, was it impossible to adopt the same practice in Georgia?
“We have only one chance—verification must rely on something that cannot be tampered with by humans. Until voter verification is done biometrically, elections will always be falsified. For example, there are machines that won’t allow you to take a ballot unless you place your finger on them. The machine confirms the fingerprint, gives you the ballot, and you proceed to the voting booth. There are also models where you can’t place a ballot in the box without biometric verification,” political analyst Irakli Melashvili told us. Melashvili has studied numerous international models and has advocated for the introduction of electronic elections since the previous administration.
Kote Kandelaki, one of the founders of the International Center for Civic Culture, has observed elections since the 1990s and contributed to drafting the Election Code. He noted that the verification device purchased by the CEC only simplified one aspect: replacing paper desk lists with digital lists. However, the most delicate issue for fraud prevention—voter identity verification—remains problematic.
“There were other expectations for the verification device, which I don’t understand, as it introduced no novelty beyond faster voter registration. It was clear that this device could not prevent the ‘carousel.’ Risks such as voting on behalf of others and repeated voting remained. The counterargument was that ‘at least there’s marking’ or ‘the full photo appears on the screen, and the observer can see it.’ However, even if observers were given the opportunity this year, it would have been very difficult to identify individuals, as you’d have to stand in one place all day without moving… Biometric recognition is the ideal solution, just like during border crossings,” Kote Kandelaki explained.
Akaki Khuskivadze thinks the same. He has been observing elections since 1995. From 2007 to 2019, he was the chairman of the Saburtalo District Election Commission, and for two years, he was the chief training specialist at the CEC. Currently, he is the chairman of the “Association for Public Initiatives.” For the 2024 elections, he was a trainer for the initiative group “Observe” and trained about 1,000 observers.
“The most important thing, which the CEC categorically opposes, is ‘one person, one vote.’ This is ensured by fingerprints or facial scanning. A fingerprint is unique, and in such a case, it is impossible for one person to vote twice. The deputy chairman of the CEC, Giorgi Sharabidze, stated at every meeting that this is an outdated African method. This is a distorted view and misleading the public. They also say that European countries do not use this… Excuse me, in Europe, no one would even think of peeking into someone else’s ballot,” Khuskivadze told us.
He also recalls that verification devices were not initially a proposal from the opposition, civil society, or international partners; rather, they were enthusiastically added by Georgian Dream representatives in the CEC.
Another respondent, who asked to remain anonymous, confirmed this. He has been observing elections for more than twenty years and is well-acquainted with election administration processes.
“Initially, verification devices were not included in the opposition’s demands. They brought up this topic themselves, and I think they already knew how they would use it. For example, during the pilot elections in Tsaishi, there were no verification devices—just regular printed desk lists. Later, they either came up with it themselves or someone advised them to add it. The best option would have been verification with iris scanning, but they calculated, and it turned out to be very expensive. If they had wanted fair and free elections, of course, they could have done better, but they tailored everything to fit their needs from the beginning to the end.”
Biometric voter verification is used by more than 50 countries worldwide. Most of these are in Asia, Africa, and South America. In Europe and the United States, voting is generally conducted using traditional paper ballots, by mail, or remotely.
If the CEC decides to implement this method in the future, two things will be necessary: a few minor amendments to the legislation and the consolidation of voters’ biometric data into a unified database [currently, such a database does not exist].
We asked personal data experts Londa Toloraia and Giorgi Gabrielashvili what challenges might arise in implementing this system. Both agree that if there is a willingness, introducing biometric recognition would neither be too difficult nor too expensive.
“Biometric data is a special category and can be processed if it serves to protect significant public interest. What can be a greater and more significant public interest than elections? Accordingly, the CEC could process such biometric data on a legal basis. Another basis for using such data is to prevent crime. If there was a likelihood of votes being cast through ‘carousel’ fraud, that is, of course, a crime,” explained Londa Toloraia, who was the head of the State Inspector’s Service from 2019 to 2022.
The head of the CEC’s Public Relations Office, Natia Ioseliani, also confirmed that biometric recognition models were tested during pilot elections. However, shortcomings were identified, and the system was not implemented. We asked what specific challenges were encountered and whether different types of verification devices were studied, compared, and selected based on this research.
“All parties involved noted that using such technologies was difficult to manage. I know it took a lot of time and caused significant delays… The CEC conducted several pilot elections, both on a small scale and in various regions, during by-elections… Naturally, there were positive aspects as well as challenges,” Natia Ioseliani responded.
Regarding fingerprint verification, she stated: “The implementation of this version was not discussed, as there is no database of fingerprints.”
Unilaterally, behind closed doors—this is how the CEC selected Smartmatic’s verification devices.
We spoke with opposition members of the CEC, representatives of parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties, election researchers, and former election administration officials. All of them told us the same thing: the decision to purchase Smartmatic’s verification devices was made by Georgian Dream representatives at the CEC—independently and according to their preferences. No broad discussions were held on the matter.
“Before introducing electronic technologies, sufficient time should be allocated for public discussions and studying the technologies, which will impact the level of trust in the process,” said the OSCE/ODIHR in 2021.
“Unexpected,” “sudden,” “tailored to them”—this is how our respondents describe the CEC’s initiative to make voter registration digital for the 2024 elections.
- 2018 By-Elections: Electronic vote-counting machines were used in three precincts in Tsaishi, Zugdidi.
- 2019 By-Elections/Special Elections: Vote-counting machines were used in Tkibuli and Tskaltubo electoral districts.
- 2021 Municipal Elections: Vote-counting machines were used in the Krtsanisi district.
- October 2022 By-Elections: Verification devices were used alongside vote counters in Senaki for the first time.
- 2023 By-Elections/Special Elections: Both vote counters and verification devices were used in April and October elections.
“There was no access to the equipment at all. Nobody was allowed to see it, and I’m talking about neutral people, not Georgian Dream supporters or the CEC under their control… Even the opposition members of the CEC were confronted with a fait accompli. Georgian Dream fenced everything off and didn’t let anyone in,” explained Akaki Khuskivadze, former chairman of the Saburtalo District Election Commission.
Factcheck spoke with opposition members of the CEC from Strategy Aghmashenebeli and Lelo. Both described how they were excluded from the process and not involved in the procurement of the verification devices.
As Anna Kobakhidze explained, the CEC was so closed off that opposition members were not even invited to official meetings. The devices were introduced post-factum, after their purchase, during formal presentations organized by Irakli Khorbaladze. According to the opposition, they have been excluded from the process since December 2022, when changes were made to the rules for forming the CEC.
“We had no role in drafting the tasks given to Smartmatic, such as what the technology was supposed to accomplish. Initially, a working group was created, and there seemed to be an attempt to consider what the opposition had to say… But since 2022, we’ve been entirely excluded. To give you the full picture, neutral members of the CEC commission handle logistical and administrative matters, while the eight opposition members are completely disconnected,” said Anna Kobakhidze.
“In announcing the tender, developing the contract requirements, and all other related processes, only the CEC was involved. No one else—neither opposition members of the CEC nor the non-governmental sector—was involved. Everything was done centrally… At the legislative level, we supported the introduction of technology in voting, but we weren’t involved in how the specific device was selected, its technical specifications, and so on,” Giorgi Sioridze, another opposition member of the CEC from the party Lelo for Georgia, told us.
As it turns out, only the CEC and Georgian Dream representatives decided what kind of verification devices were needed and from which company. The procurement details remain unknown to the following opposition groups: “Droa,” “United National Movement,” “For Georgia” (Gakharia’s party), “Lelo for Georgia,” and the “Coalition for Change.”
“We weren’t a parliamentary party, but despite this, the CEC should have communicated with us… It was very public that Smartmatic devices would be chosen. As far as I know, no alternative was considered. The focus and campaign were all about this company, emphasizing its extensive experience. I don’t think this was proposed by the opposition; the CEC kept emphasizing this itself,” said Keti Barbakadze, a lawyer for the “Droa” party.
“The so-called neutral members of the CEC are selected by parliament. I’ve known them for years, and I know what their ‘neutrality’ means… It’s nothing but serving Georgian Dream. These people introduced the system… We handed the CEC and the ruling party much broader opportunities for election fraud. Where are the paper lists we used to see, and where is the software you create yourself? In the end, Georgian Dream developed the technical specifications, selected the company, placed the order, created the files, brought in the auditor [laughs], and asked the questions themselves. As a result, Georgian Dream had full control over all three devices, and no one had the chance to monitor how accurately they worked,” said Vano Burduli, former chairman of the Didube District Commission (2009–2017), former CEC staff member (2017–2020), and now a member of the United National Movement.
The CEC rejects these accusations and blames the opposition for not showing enough interest, claiming that everything was public, and nothing was left unclear.
We asked the head of the CEC’s Public Relations Office, Natia Ioseliani, three times why it wasn’t possible to involve opposition members in developing the technical specifications for Smartmatic. Initially, she responded indirectly, citing pilot elections from 2018–2022 as an example of opposition involvement.
When asked if there was any evidence, such as photos or records, to show that the technical specifications were not prepared solely by the CEC, she said:
“According to the legal requirement enacted on December 22, 2022, it was not hidden that elections in Georgia would be conducted using electronic means. The relevant department conducts the necessary research.”
When pressed further on which specific department was responsible for preparing the technical specifications, Ioseliani replied:
“The relevant one, the relevant… that would be the financial and procurement division. You’re presenting this as if members had no access to this. All information with us is public and accessible. No one can say they showed interest, requested any information, and were denied. On the contrary, I would ask them to present evidence showing they wanted to be involved and were excluded. As a law-abiding institution, the election administration conducts all activities within the law. I’ll end my response here because my answer is: they were informed.”
Ultimately, when discussing alternatives to verification devices, all of our respondents agree that the main issue was the will to act. Administering elections honestly was neither difficult nor prohibitively expensive.
This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of iFact and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union
