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სკამერების დაბრუნება - A.K ჯგუფი

“The Return of the Scammers: A.K. Group Agents Continue Their Fraud”

Authors: OCCRP, iFact, GMC, and Studio Monitor

When we exposed the Georgian “empire” of call centers a month and a half ago, you might have thought it would put an end to their fraudulent activities. But things turned out differently.

Following our journalistic investigation, A.K. Group employees began gradually disappearing—leaving the office, deleting their social media accounts, and removing posts that showcased their lavish lifestyles.

Just days after the international exposé was published, the Georgian Prosecutor’s Office launched a criminal case against A.K. Group for fraud and money laundering. They seized real estate and movable property belonging to more than five agents and their “boss,” Akaki Kevkhishvili.

But these punitive actions didn’t stop the “scammers.” They soon resumed their fraudulent operations. This is confirmed by leaked internal records obtained by Qurium, a Swedish digital forensics group and OCCRP partner.

According to these documents, 14 agents from the Georgian call center were active on the Voice-over-IP (VoIP) platform as recently as late March, using a program called Squaretalk to make calls. At least 184 calls were made through this system.

VoIP technology allows fraudsters to make large volumes of calls without revealing their exact country of origin.

A.K. Group-ის ყოფილი ოფისი თბილისში, ქავთარაძის ქუჩაზე, ფოტო: ფინეთის ეროვნული საზოგადოებრივი მაუწყებლი "YLE"

The evidence acquired by OCCRP and its partner is dated March 25, indicating that scammers resumed operations just a few weeks after being exposed.

That Squaretalk was used to contact victims is corroborated by other leaked information. We found login credentials for the system, and financial records show payments made to Squaretalk from August 2023 to March 2025—totaling at least $150,000.

Fourteen agents used Squaretalk, including one named “Luke Wade.” In our previous investigation, we identified this as an alias of Zviad Urushadze, who worked in A.K. Group’s IT

ზვიად ურუშაძე

Although Urushadze was not a scammer agent himself, he was fully aware that both he and his colleagues were engaged in fraud. In one Telegram chat, he asked a colleague: “Does [the person attending the online meeting] know we’re scammers?” Notably, Urushadze’s Telegram channel remains active as of recent days. We sent him questions, but received no response before this article’s publication.

Besides Urushadze, other members of A.K. Group’s “client retention” team also used Squaretalk at the end of March. According to our investigation, this team generated the most revenue for the fraudulent call center—i.e., stole the most money.

The potential victim is first contacted by a member of the so-called “initiator” group, who promises to connect them with an experienced broker to help them earn money. Then, the “client retention” group takes over. These more experienced scammers ensure the victim doesn’t escape and try to extract as much money as possible.

You might be wondering: what could Squaretalk have done to make life harder for these scammers? We posed this question to cybersecurity expert Kevin Hendricks.

According to him, Squaretalk is obligated to cancel subscriptions if it becomes aware that users are misusing the platform:

სქრინი გამოჟონილი დოკუმენტებიდან - squaretalk-ის ონლაინ ზარების პროგრამა
SquareTalk call interface

“As soon as VoIP providers realize scammers are using their services, responsibility shifts to them. Ultimately, they’re private companies—they can refuse service and cancel subscriptions. In fact, when it comes to fraud schemes, canceling subscriptions isn’t enough—they should also cooperate with law enforcement. That’s important, because if a scammer can’t reach a victim, they can’t defraud them either.”

We also contacted Squaretalk to include their response. The company’s legal representative, Dimitry Borajiev, told OCCRP and partner Qurium in writing that they have been cooperating with law enforcement since January 2025 regarding scammer accounts.

“This cooperation includes complying with court orders for data disclosure and supporting confidential police investigations… Squaretalk remains committed to the principles of its communication platform and continues its fight against fraudulent activities,” said Borajiev.

He added that they could not share more details at this stage and cannot cancel scammers’ active subscriptions at the moment due to ongoing investigations.

A.K. Group’s Partnership with Squaretalk

To pay Squaretalk and receive money extorted from victims, A.K. Group used a UK-registered company, Intek Systems Limited. Officially, it operated from 2019 until January 2025 and belonged to Lithuanian national Evgeny Roshchenkov. But documents examined by our team show it was actually controlled by Georgian scammers.

Leaked files include a screen recording from the computer of A.K. Group’s financier, Nika Basaria (aka “Neal Cassidy”), which reveals that he had Roshchenkov’s digital signature and used it to make various payments.

In the documents, Roshchenkov is listed as the owner of Intek Systems, while the contact for financial matters is someone named “Ashley Moriarty”—a pseudonym for A.K. Group’s financial manager, Ketevan Malashkhia (Levchenko), a newly identified fraudster.

From the documents we obtained, we learned that A.K. Group transferred at least $5,000 to Squaretalk via Intek Systems—including $3,000 in late March 2025, nearly three weeks after our exposé.

We sent questions to the newly exposed scammer “Ashley Moriarty” (i.e., Ketevan Malashkhia) to give her a chance to respond. She opened the message but did not reply. We also heard nothing from the A.K. Group “boss” Akaki Kevkhishvili, whom we asked about the return of the scammers.

სკამერების ჩატის სქრინი

What We Discovered About the Call Center “Empire” and What Prosecutors Are Doing

In early March 2025, iFact and OCCRP, alongside 30 media partners, exposed a criminal scheme operating out of Tbilisi. We named 24 individuals involved in fraud, both agents and their supervisors.

We also found that A.K. Group employed over 80 people and defrauded at least 6,100 victims over three years, stealing more than $35 million. Our investigation showed that the call center was run by a company called A.K. Group, officially owned by 36-year-old Meri Shotadze.

მერი შოთაძე - სკამერი A.K Group

We also revealed how these young people spent the stolen money. Our film documents their luxurious lifestyles.

Leaked materials also allowed us to show how Georgian “scammers” treated victims—not just robbing them, but also psychologically abusing them.

When Studio Monitor, a co-author of this investigation, asked the Prosecutor’s Office about the scammers’ return, Baia Tsanava, head of public relations, replied that they had no information but would notify us if they received any. She also said that prosecutors are cooperating with foreign colleagues to identify suspects and potential victims.

We asked a lawyer to explain what it means that the scammers resumed criminal activity despite the investigation and revelations. Giorgi Davituri, a lawyer from the Institute for Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI), believes Georgian law enforcement agencies are not investigating call centers properly because the schemes are politically connected:

“This is a politically affiliated criminal scheme. It’s impossible that so much money could circulate in the country for years without law enforcement knowing. That suggests the operations are coordinated [with politicians]. From my observation, authorities only act effectively when under international pressure. And there’s nothing in the law preventing them from pursuing these crimes. We don’t need a local victim or even testimony from, say, a German pensioner. Given the scale of illicit income, we could easily initiate prosecution under the unexplained wealth provision.”

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